Selection on Welfare Gains: Experimental Evidence from Electricity Plan Choice
Koichiro Ito,
Takanori Ida and
Makoto Tanaka
Discussion papers from Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI)
Abstract:
We study a problem in which policymakers need to screen self-selected individuals based on their unobserved heterogeneity in the social welfare gains resulting from a policy intervention. In our framework, the marginal treatment effects and marginal treatment responses arise as key statistics that allow for the characterization of social welfare. We apply this framework to a randomized field experiment on electricity plan choice. Consumers were offered socially efficient dynamic pricing with randomly assigned take-up incentives. We find that price-elastic consumers—who generate larger welfare gains—are more likely to self-select. Our counterfactual simulations quantify the optimal take-up incentives that exploit observed and unobserved heterogeneity in selection and welfare gains.
Pages: 48 pages
Date: 2021-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/publications/dp/21e008.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Selection on Welfare Gains: Experimental Evidence from Electricity Plan Choice (2023) 
Working Paper: Selection on Welfare Gains: Experimental Evidence from Electricity Plan Choice (2021) 
Working Paper: Selection on Welfare Gains: Experimental Evidence from Electricity Plan Choice (2021) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eti:dpaper:21008
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Discussion papers from Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by TANIMOTO, Toko ().