Patent Infringement, Technology Selection, and Non-Practicing Entities (Japanese)

Yuka Ohno

Discussion Papers (Japanese) from Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI)

Abstract: I construct a simple thee-period game to investigate the effects of patent infringement litigations and patent ownership by non-practicing entities (NPEs) on technology selection for a new product. A firm may choose to embed fewer high-tech features into the new product in order to avoid or delay potential patent infringement lawsuits. NPEs tend to bring patent infringement lawsuits later than practicing entities (PE). In contrast to commonly believed, the technology-adopting firm may be willing to incorporate more technology features when the potentially-infringing patents are owned by an NPE than by a PE.

Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2013-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cwa, nep-ino, nep-ipr and nep-pr~
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