Who is against Free Migration? Lobbying, the Non-traded Sector and the Choice between the Customs Union and the Common Market

Cyrille Schwellnus

No ECO2005/06, Economics Working Papers from European University Institute

Abstract: While economists usually resort to redistribution between individuals of different skill levels and majority voting when explaining migration policies, the present political economy model of preferential trade and migration agreements suggests an alternative approach based on the following two observations. Firstly, in the presence of free trade in goods between the member states of the EU, migration between the member states mainly redistributes income between individuals employed in the traded and the non-traded sectors. Secondly, various episodes of restrictive migration legislation suggest that lobbying from vocal interest groups rather than majority voting shapes migration policies in the EU.

Keywords: Trade Negotiations; International Migration; Lobbying; European Enlargement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 F15 F22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int and nep-pol
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