Imitation and Selective Matching in Reputational Games

Thierry Vignolo ()

No ECO2007/31, Economics Working Papers from European University Institute

Abstract: This paper investigates imitation and selective matching in reputational games with an outside option. We identify two classes of such games, which are ultimatum and trust games. By selective matching we mean that short-runplayers have the possibility of selecting the long-run player they play against. We find that selective matching (unlike random matching) favors the equilibrium associated to reputation in the ultimatum game but not in the trust game.

Keywords: Reputation; Long-run equilibria; Selective matching; Games with an outside option (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Journal Article: Imitation and selective matching in reputational games (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2007/31

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