Inventors and Impostors: An Economic Analysis of Patent Examination
Florian Schuett
No ECO2009/28, Economics Working Papers from European University Institute
Abstract:
The objective of patent examination is to separate the wheat from the chaff. Good applications - those satisfying the patentability criteria, particularly novelty and nonobviousness - should be accepted, while bad applications should be rejected. How should incentives for examiners be designed to further this objective? This paper develops a theoretical model of patent examination to address the question. It argues that examination can be described as a moral-hazard problem followed by an adverse-selection problem: the examiner must be given incentives to exert effort (looking for evidence to reject), but also to truthfully reveal the evidence he finds (or lack thereof). The model can explain the puzzling compensation scheme in use at the U.S. patent office, where examiners are essentially rewarded for granting patents, as well as variation in compensation schemes across patent offices. It also has implications for the retention of examiners and for administrative patent review.
Keywords: innovation; patent office; soft information; intrinsic motivation; incentives for bureaucrats (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 D82 L50 O31 O38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-ino, nep-ipr and nep-pr~
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Journal Article: Patent quality and incentives at the patent office (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2009/28
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