Approval Quorums Dominate Participation Quorums

Maniquet, François; Morelli, Massimo
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Francois Paul Maniquet and Massimo Morelli ()

No ECO2010/13, Economics Working Papers from European University Institute

Abstract: We study direct democracy with population uncertainty. Voters' participation is often among the desiderata by the election designer. A participation quorum is a threshold on the fraction of participating voters below which the status quo is kept. We show that participation quorums produce incentive for partisans of the status quo to abstain, with the consequence that the status quo may be kept in situations where the planner would prefer the reform, or the reform is passed when the planner prefers the status quo. An approval quorum is a threshold on the number of voters expressing a ballot in favor of the reform below which the status quo is kept. We show that approval quorums do not suffer from the drawbacks of participation quorums. Moreover, an electoral system with approval quorum performs better than one with participation quorum even when the planner wishes to implement the corresponding participation quorum social choice function.

Keywords: Proportional Influence; Winner-Take-All; Underdog Compensation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Approval quorums dominate participation quorums (2015)
Working Paper: Approval quorums dominate participation quorums (2015)
Working Paper: Approval quorums dominate participation quorums (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2010/13

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