Insights into the nucleolus of the assignment game

Javier Martínez-de-Albéniz, Carles Rafels () and Neus Ybern ()
Additional contact information
Carles Rafels: Universitat de Barcelona
Neus Ybern: Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya

No 2015/333, UB School of Economics Working Papers from University of Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We show that the family of assignment matrices which give rise to the same nucleolus form a compact join-semilattice with one maximal element, which is always a valuation (see p.43, Topkis (1998)). We give an explicit form of this valuation matrix. The above family is in general not a convex set, but path-connected, and we construct minimal elements of this family. We also analyze the conditions to ensure that a given vector is the nucleolus of some assignment game.

Keywords: Assignment game; core; nucleolus; semilattice. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.ub.edu/ubeconomics/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/333WEB.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ewp:wpaper:333web

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in UB School of Economics Working Papers from University of Barcelona School of Economics Av. Diagonal 690, 08034 Barcelona. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by University of Barcelona School of Economics ().