An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game

Ata Atay

No 2016/350, UB School of Economics Working Papers from University of Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: Solymosi and Raghavan (2001) characterize the stability of the core of the assignment game by means of a property of the valuation matrix. They show that the core of an assignment game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if its valuation matrix has a dominant diagonal. Their proof makes use of some graph-theoretical tools, while the present proof relies on the notion of buyer-seller exact representative in Núñez and Rafels (2002).

Keywords: Assignment game; core; stability; von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9 pages
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-hpe
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://diposit.ub.edu/dspace/bitstream/2445/102040 ... Atay_Alternative.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ewp:wpaper:350web

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in UB School of Economics Working Papers from University of Barcelona School of Economics Av. Diagonal 690, 08034 Barcelona. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by University of Barcelona School of Economics ().