Games with Graph Restricted Communication and Levels Structure of Cooperation

Oriol Tejada and Mikel Álvarez-Mozos

No 2017/363, UB School of Economics Working Papers from University of Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We analyze surplus allocation problems where cooperation between agents is restricted both by a communication graph and by a sequence of embedded partitions of the agent set. For this type of problem, we define and characterize two new values extending the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value respectively. Our results enable the axiomatic comparison between the two values and provide some basic insights for the analysis of fair resource allocation in nowadays fully integrated societies.

Keywords: Coalitional games; Restricted cooperation; Graph restricted communication; Levels structure; Shapley value; Banzhaf value. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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