Axioms for the optimal stable rules and fair-division rules in a multiple-partners job market

Gerard Domènech Gironell () and Marina Núñez Oliva ()
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Gerard Domènech Gironell: Universitat de Barcelona
Marina Núñez Oliva: Universitat de Barcelona
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Marina Núñez ()

No 2022/419, UB School of Economics Working Papers from University of Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: In the multiple-partners job market, introduced in (Sotomayor, 1992), each firm can hire several workers and each worker can be hired by several firms, up to a given quota. We show that, in contrast to what happens in the simple assignment game, in this extension, the firms-optimal stable rules are neither valuation monotonic nor pairwise monotonic. However, we show that the firms-optimal stable rules satisfy a weaker property, what we call firmcovariance, and that this property characterizes these rules among all stable rules. This property allows us to shed some light on how firms can (and cannot) manipulate the firms-optimal stable rules. In particular, we show that firms cannot manipulate them by constantly over-reporting their valuations. Analogous results hold when focusing on the workers. Finally, we extend to the multiple-partners market a known characterization of the fair-division rules on the domain of simple assignment games.

Keywords: Assignment game; stable rules; fair division. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-des and nep-gth
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