Direct Tests of Models of Social Preferences and a New Model

James Cox and Vjollca Sadiraj

No 2006-13, Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series from Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University

Abstract: Departures from "economic man" behavior in many games in which fairness is a salient characteristic are now well documented in the experimental economics literature. These data have inspired development of new models of social preferences incorporating inequality aversion and quasi-maximin preferences. We report experiments that provide direct tests of these social preference models. Data from the experiments motivate a new model of egocentric altruism. The model rationalizes data from our direct test experiments and data from experiments with proposer competition and responder competition. We discuss generalizations of the egocentric altruism model that incorporate agentsâ?? intentions and thus provide a unified approach to modeling behavior in games both with and without reciprocal motivation.

JEL-codes: A12 A13 B49 C70 C91 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37
Date: 2006-10, Revised 2010-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-upt
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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http://excen.gsu.edu/workingpapers/GSU_EXCEN_WP_2006-13.pdf First version, 2006 (application/pdf)
http://excen.gsu.edu/workingpapers/GSU_EXCEN_WP_2010-03.pdf Revised version, 2010 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:exc:wpaper:2006-13

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