How do people play against Nash opponents in games which have a mixed strategy equilibrium?

Jason Shachat and J. Swarthout

No 2008-07, Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series from Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University

Abstract: We examine experimentally how humans behave when they, unbeknownst to them, play against a computer which implements its part of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. We consider two games, one zero-sum and another unprofitable with a pure minimax strategy. A minority of subjects' play was consistent with their Nash equilibrium strategy. But a larger percentage of subjects' play was more consistent with different models of play: equal-probable play for the zero-sum game, and the minimax strategy in the non-profitable game.

Pages: 16
Date: 2008-03, Revised 2011-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-mic
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http://excen.gsu.edu/workingpapers/GSU_EXCEN_WP_2008-07.pdf First version, 2008 (application/pdf)
http://excen.gsu.edu/workingpapers/GSU_EXCEN_WP_2011-04.pdf Revised version, 2011 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:exc:wpaper:2008-07

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