Trust with Private and Common Property: Effects of Stronger Property Right Entitlements

James Cox and Daniel Hall

No 2010-07, Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series from Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University

Abstract: Is mutually beneficial cooperation in trust games more prevalent with private property or common property? Does the strength of property right entitlement affect the answer? Cox, Ostrom, Walker, et al. [1] report little difference between cooperation in private and common property trust games. We assign stronger property right entitlements by requiring subjects to meet a performance quota in a real effort task to earn their endowments. We find that cooperation is lower in common property trust games than in private property trust games, which is an idiosyncratic prediction of revealed altruism theory [2].

Pages: 26
Date: 2010-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-ipr, nep-pr~ and nep-soc
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Journal Article: Trust with Private and Common Property: Effects of Stronger Property Right Entitlements (2010)
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