Tax Incidence: Do Institutions Matter? An Experimental Study

James Cox, Mark Rider and Astha Sen

No 2012-17, Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series from Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University

Abstract: There is perhaps no more important question in public finance than who ultimately bears the burden of a tax. According to tax incidence theory, the long-run incidence of a tax in competitive markets is independent of the assignment of the liability to pay tax. Moreover, the theory is silent on the possible effects of market institutions on tax incidence. We report data from an experiment designed to address two questions: (A) Is tax incidence independent of the assignment of the liability to pay tax in experimental markets? (B) Is tax incidence independent of the market institution in experimental markets? We conduct laboratory experiments with two market institutions: double auction and posted offer markets. Based on the results of Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of experimental market prices, we conclude that the answer to both question A and question B is "no."

Pages: 31
Date: 2012-10, Revised 2017-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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http://excen.gsu.edu/workingpapers/GSU_EXCEN_WP_2012-17.pdf First version, 2012 (application/pdf)
http://excen.gsu.edu/workingpapers/GSU_EXCEN_WP_2013-02.pdf Revised version, 2013 (application/pdf)
http://excen.gsu.edu/workingpapers/GSU_EXCEN_WP_2017-02.pdf Revised version, 2017 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:exc:wpaper:2012-17

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