Cultural Identities and Resolution of Social Dilemmas

James Cox, Vjollca Sadiraj and Urmimala Sen

No 2017-08, Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series from Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University

Abstract: An experiment is reported for payoff-equivalent public good and common pool games with high caste and low caste West Bengali villagers. Tests are reported for models of unconditional social preferences, models of reciprocity, and cultural identity. Results from the artefactual field experiment indicate that when information about caste is withheld no significant difference is observed in the efficiency of play between the villagers and student subjects at American universities in games with positive and negative externalities. In contrast, making the hereditary class structure salient induces different behavior among villagers. Providing caste information leads to: (i) the lowest level of efficiency when low caste first movers interact with a low caste second mover, and (ii) the highest level of efficiency when high caste first movers interact with a high caste second mover. Cross-caste play generates intermediate levels of efficiency.

JEL-codes: C70 C93 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30
Date: 2017-12, Revised 2018-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://excen.gsu.edu/workingpapers/GSU_EXCEN_WP_2017-08.pdf First version, 2017 (application/pdf)
http://excen.gsu.edu/workingpapers/GSU_EXCEN_WP_2018-03.pdf Revised version, 2018 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: CULTURAL IDENTITIES AND RESOLUTION OF SOCIAL DILEMMAS (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:exc:wpaper:2017-08

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