Morally Monotonic Choice in Public Good Games

James Cox, Vjollca Sadiraj and Susan Xu Tang

No 2020-05, Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series from Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University

Abstract: Decades of robust data from public good games with positive and negative externalities challenges internal consistency axioms that comprise rational choice theory. This paper reports an extension of rational choice theory that incorporates observable moral reference points. This morally monotonic choice theory is consistent with data in the literature and has idiosyncratic features that motivate new experimental designs. We report experiments on choices in public good games with positive, negative, and mixed-sign externalities, with and without non-binding quotas on extractions or minimum contributions. Data favors choices predicted by moral monotonicity over choices predicted by: (a) conventional rational choice theory; or (b) conventional reference dependent model of loss aversion.

Keywords: choice theory; public goods; externalities; crowding out; moral reference points; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D62 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 48
Date: 2020-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-upt
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http://excen.gsu.edu/workingpapers/GSU_EXCEN_WP_2020-05.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Morally Monotonic Choice in Public Good Games (2024)
Journal Article: Morally monotonic choice in public good games (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:exc:wpaper:2020-05

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