Morally Monotonic Choice in Public Good Games

James Cox, Vjollca Sadiraj and Susan Xu Tang

No 2022-01, Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series from Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University

Abstract: Consequentialist rational choice theory, including models of (unconditional) social preferences, is challenged by decades of robust data from payoff-equivalent public good games with provision or appropriation as well as by robust data showing contributions to public goods, funded by lump-sum taxation, do not crowd out voluntary contributions on a one-for-one basis. This paper offers an extension of rational choice theory that incorporates observable moral reference points. This morally monotonic choice theory is consistent with robust data in the literature and has idiosyncratic features that motivate new experimental designs that introduce nonbinding quotas on appropriations or floors on provisions. Data, from three previous experiments and our new experiment, favor moral monotonicity over alternative theoretical models including rational choice theory, prominent belief-based models of kindness, and popular reference-dependent models with loss aversion.

Keywords: choice theory; public goods; experiment; payoff equivalence; non-binding contractions; moral reference points; belief-based psychological models; reference-dependent choices (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D03 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 49
Date: 2022-07, Revised 2024-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-pub
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http://excen.gsu.edu/workingpapers/GSU_EXCEN_WP_2022-01.pdf First version, 2022 (application/pdf)
http://excen.gsu.edu/workingpapers/GSU_EXCEN_WP_2023-02.pdf Revised version, 2023 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Morally monotonic choice in public good games (2023)
Working Paper: Morally Monotonic Choice in Public Good Games (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:exc:wpaper:2022-01

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