Inequality in Developing Economies: The Role of Institutional Development

Adalgiso Amendola, Joshy Easaw and Antonio Savoia
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Joshy Easaw: University of Swansea

No 1107, Discussion Papers from University of Exeter, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper studies the distributive impact of institutional change in developing countries. In such economies, property rights systems may preserve the interests of an influential minority, who can control key-markets, access to assets and investment opportunities, especially if they enjoy disproportionate political power. We test this hypothesis using cross-section and panel data methods on a sample of low- and middle-income economies from Africa, Asia and Latin America. Results suggest that: (a) increasing property rights protection increases income inequality; (b) this effect is larger in low-democracy environments; (c) few countries have developed political institutions capable of counterbalancing this effect.

Keywords: Inequality; developing economies; institutions; property rights; democracy. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 O15 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev, nep-pol and nep-sea
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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https://exetereconomics.github.io/RePEc/dpapers/DP1107.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Inequality in developing economies: the role of institutional development (2013)
Working Paper: Inequality in Developing Economies: The Role of Institutional Development (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:exe:wpaper:1107

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