Discrimination via Exclusion: An Experiment on Group Identity and Club Goods

Surajeet Chakravarty and Miguel Fonseca
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Surajeet Chakravarty: Department of Economics, University of Exeter

No 1302, Discussion Papers from University of Exeter, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study using laboratory experiments the impact on cooperation of allowing individuals to invest in group-specific, excludable public goods. We find that allowing different social groups to voluntarily contribute to such goods increases total contributions. However, a significant proportion of that contribution goes towards the group-specific club good, rather than the public good, even when the latter has higher financial returns to cooperation. We find significant evidence of in-group biases, which are manifested by positive in-group reciprocity. That is, club goods allow subjects to display their preferences for interaction with their in-group members, as well as in positive in-group reciprocity.

Keywords: club goods; social identity; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D02 D03 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-dem, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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https://exetereconomics.github.io/RePEc/dpapers/DP1302.pdf (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: Discrimination via Exclusion: An Experiment on Group Identity and Club Goods (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:exe:wpaper:1302

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