Cultural Norms and Identity in Coordination Games
Jo Peryman and
David Kelsey
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Jo Peryman: RMIT University, Melbourne
No 1505, Discussion Papers from University of Exeter, Department of Economics
Abstract:
We run experiments with a stag hunt and bargaining coordination game. Using a between-subjects design, we vary the identity of the opponent between someone of the same culture or a different culture. The idea is to see whether cultural norms or identity play a part in coordination decisions. We compare the responses of British and Asian students at the University of Exeter and show the cultural identity of the opponent by physical appearance. The players appear to use cultural stereotypes to predict behaviour, especially in the bargaining game which may require more strategic thought than the stag hunt game. In particular, the British act in way that indicates they believe the Asians will behave more cautiously than other British. According to our results, the stereotype of Asians being cautious is misleading.
Keywords: culture; identity; norms; coordination; bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C29 C71 C72 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:exe:wpaper:1505
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