Endogenous Sanctioning Institutions and Migration Patterns: Experimental Evidence

Ramon Cobo-Reyes, Gabriel Katz and Simone Meraglia
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Gabriel Katz: Department of Politics, University of Exeter
Simone Meraglia: Department of Economics, University of Exeter

No 1702, Discussion Papers from University of Exeter, Department of Economics

Abstract: We experimentally analyze the effect of the endogenous choice of sanctioning institutions on cooperation and migration patterns across societies. In our experiment, subjects are allocated to one of two groups, are endowed with group-specific preferences, and play a public goods game for 30 periods. Each period, subjects can move between groups and, at fixed intervals, can vote on whether to implement formal (centralized) sanctioning institutions in their group. We compare this environment to one in which only one group is exogenously endowed with sanctioning institutions. We find that subjects' ability to vote on institutions leads to (i) a more efficient partition of subjects between groups, (ii) a lower migration rate, (iii) an increase in overall payoffs, and (iv) a decrease in both inter- and intra-groups (payoff) inequality. Over time, subjects tend to vote for sanctioning institutions and contribute to the public good.

Keywords: Formal Sanctions; Cooperation; Migration; Voting; Experiment. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C91 C92 D72 H41 H73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-mig and nep-pol
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https://exetereconomics.github.io/RePEc/dpapers/DP1702.pdf (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: Endogenous sanctioning institutions and migration patterns: Experimental evidence (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:exe:wpaper:1702

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