La manipolazione dei valori di bilancio: pressione del management e tratti personali nell?attivit? del controller

Lorenzo Lucianetti and Valentina Battista

MANAGEMENT CONTROL, 2015, vol. 2015/1, issue 1, 101-132

Abstract: Using a survey from 154 Italian accounting controllers, the paper examines the role of Top management pressure, moral disengagement and professional commitment on the decision to accept earnings manipulation. Based upon previous literature, two different kinds of earnings manipulations are considered, namely, accounting manipulations and operating manipulations. Empirical results suggest a strong relationship between earnings manipulation acceptance and earning manipulation pressure. Also, earnings management acceptance is predicted by two controller personal traits, namely, moral disengagement and professional commitment. Implications, limitations, and directions for future research are finally discussed.

JEL-codes: M10 M40 M41 M42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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