Voting Weights or Agenda Control: Which One Really Matters?

Hannu Nurmi ()
Additional contact information
Hannu Nurmi: University of Turku, Public Choice Research Centre and Department of Political Science, Turku, Finland, http://www.soc.utu.fi/laitokset/valtio-oppi/en/

Czech Economic Review, 2010, vol. 4, issue 1, 005-017

Abstract: Much of the EU institution literature deals with the distribution of voting power in the Council and European Parliament. The increasingly sophisticated models on EU decision making tend to overlook issues pertaining agenda formation and control in various decision making bodies. This article argues that agenda control is extremely important in all collective decision making bodies. Indeed, agenda control may render the voting power distribution issue largely irrelevant.

Keywords: Agenda control; amendment procedure; no-show paradox; successive procedure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://auco.cuni.cz/mag/article/download/id/77/type/attachment (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fau:aucocz:au2010_005

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://auco.cuni.cz/

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Czech Economic Review from Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lenka Stastna ().