Equilibrium Solution in a Game between a Cooperative and its Members

Cesarino Bertini (), Gianfranco Gambarelli (), Antonino Scarelli () and Zoltán Varga ()
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Cesarino Bertini: University of Bergamo, Department of Mathematics, Statistics, Informatics and Applications, Bergamo, Italy
Gianfranco Gambarelli: University of Bergamo, Department of Mathematics, Statistics, Informatics and Applications, Bergamo, Italy
Antonino Scarelli: University of Tuscia, Department of Ecology and Sustainable Economic Development, Viterbo, Italy
Zoltán Varga: Szent István University, Institute of Mathematics and Informatics, Gödöllö, Hungary

Czech Economic Review, 2011, vol. 5, issue 2, 162-171

Abstract: In the paper a game-theoretical model is set up to describe the conflict situation in which the members of a marketing cooperative may take advantage of an external market price, higher than that offered by the cooperative. Under appropriate conditions on the penalty strategy of the cooperative, the faithfulness of all members will provide a Nash equilibrium for the considered game, which at the same time also is an attractive solution, with the cooperative as a distinguished player.

Keywords: Cooperatives; Game Theory; Nash equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C02 C70 Q13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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