Political Pressure on Central Banks: The Case of the Czech National Bank

Adam Gersl

No 2006/08, Working Papers IES from Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies

Abstract: As the independence of national central banks in the European Union is one of the main institutional features of the monetary constitution of the EU, the paper tries to find out whether central banks are factually independent in their decisions about interest rates if they face political pressure. The Havrilesky (1993) methodology of the political pressure on central banks is applied to the Czech National Bank, a central bank of one of the new EU Member States, in order to test whether the conducted monetary policy has been influenced by political pressure from various interest groups.

Keywords: political economy; monetary policy; pressure groups (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D78 E52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2006-04, Revised 2006-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac, nep-mon, nep-pol and nep-tra
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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