Corporate lobbying: A review of the recent literature
Martin Gregor ()
No 2011/32, Working Papers IES from Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies
Abstract:
This survey covers recent literature on lobbying, with particular focus on corporate lobbying. Three main research traditions --- contestsfor policy rent, persuasion games, and multiple means models --- are analyzed in detail. Various strategic aspects of lobbying arepresented in the context of a single unified model that encompasses both strategic communication and monetary contributions. Next, thereview investigates into three particular issues in the lobbying literature: (i) Incentive to lobby and the equilibrium amount of lobbying,both in the presence and absence of competitors, (ii) strategic substitution and complementarity of lobbying and contributions,and (iii) the role of intermediation in lobbying. Recent evidence from corporate lobbying is presented.
Keywords: lobbying; political contributions; menu auction; contest; persuasion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32
Date: 2011-11, Revised 2011-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
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