Quota Manipulation and Fair Voting Rules in Committees
Frantisek Turnovec ()
No 2012/08, Working Papers IES from Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies
Abstract:
The concept of fairness is being discussed related to the distribution of voting power among different actors of voting. We are using the following, intuitively natural principle of fairness: each unit of resources (shares, seats) should yield the same voting power (influence). Voting power is not directly observable: as a proxy for it voting weights are used. Therefore, fairness is usually defined in terms of voting weights (e.g. voting weights are proportional to the results of an election). Assuming that a principle of fair distribution of voting weights is selected, we are addressing the question of how to achieve equality of relative voting power (at least approximately) to relative voting weights.
Keywords: Fairness; optimal quota; simple weighted committee; strict proportional power; voting and power indices. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D72 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16pages
Date: 2012-03, Revised 2012-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://ies.fsv.cuni.cz/default/file/download/id/19877 (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://ies.fsv.cuni.cz/default/file/download/id/19877 [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://ies.fsv.cuni.cz/default/file/download/id/19877)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fau:wpaper:wp2012_08
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers IES from Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Natalie Svarcova ().