Receiver's access fee for a single sender

Martin Gregor ()

No 2014/17, Working Papers IES from Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies

Abstract: We study a game in which a sender with verifiable private information has to pay an access fee that is announced by a receiver to be able to convey her message to the receiver. The setting is motivated by the literature of pay-and-lobby politics, which finds that politicians decide to schedule informative meetings with lobbyists on the basis of their campaign contributions. We solve the game for all timings, prior beliefs, and noise and valuation parameters. We identify the receiver's tradeoff between the amount of information and the amount of revenue. At the tradeoff, the receiver decides to not receive an informative signal from the sender. Whether `burying one's head in the sand' increases or decreases welfare depends on the degree of the receiver's benevolence.

Keywords: disclosure; persuasion; hard evidence; access fee; lobbying (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 D72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23pages
Date: 2014-05, Revised 2014-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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