Does Enforcement Of the Rules Against Foreign Bribery Discourage Exports? A Case of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention

Michal Paulus (), Jaromir Baxa and Eva Michalíková

No 2020/28, Working Papers IES from Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies

Abstract: Although the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention has been signed by dozens of countries, only some of themenforce the laws against foreign bribery. To estimate whether the enforcement deters exports, we use amicrofounded gravity model of bilateral trade flows of 132 countries. Our results imply that enforcement ofthe rules decreases the export flows to countries with a higher corruption distance significantly, particularlyin product categories characterized by differentiated goods. Moreover, the effects of the host-countrycorruption on exports of the nonenforcing countries are limited, and similar to the impact on the exports from countries that did not sign the Convention at all. Therefore, the main aim of the Convention to level the field in international trade has not been reached yet, even among the signatory countries.

Keywords: Corruption; International trade; Gravity model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 F14 F53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 49 pages
Date: 2020-08, Revised 2020-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fau:wpaper:wp2020_28

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