Statistical Discrimination and Committees

J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz, Juan José Ganuza and Paola Profeta

No 2021-06, Working Papers from FEDEA

Abstract: We develop a statistical discrimination model where groups of workers (males-females) differ in the observability of their productivity signals by the evaluation committee. We assume that the informativeness of the productivity signals depends on the match between the potential worker and the interviewer: when both parties have similar backgrounds, the signal is likely to be more informative.

Date: 2021-02
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