Spending Preferences of Public Sector Officials. Survey Evidence from the Finnish Central Government
Jaakko Kiander and
Takis Venetoklis ()
No 114, Research Reports from VATT Institute for Economic Research
Abstract:
We examine the determinants that shape the spending preferences of public sector employees on several budgetary appropriations. Following Niskanen's (1971, 1975, 1994) budget maximising theory, we test whether these employees prefer larger budgetary appropriations rather than less. We measure their preferences to increase their own bureau's appropriations and compare those against their preferences for other bureaux's appropriations. The empirical evidence is gathered via a mail survey targeting high level officials from different Ministries in Finland. The analysis of the responses suggests that Niskanen's theory is supported, in part.
Keywords: Bureaucratic behaviour, budgetary determinants, budgetary process, Economic growth, Taloudellinen kasvu, Macroeconomic policy, Talouspolitiikka, Taxation and Social Transfers, Julkisen talouden rahoitus ja tulonsiirrot, D730 - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption, H610 - National Budget; Budget Systems, H830 - Public Administration, (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fer:resrep:114
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