Subsidy Bidding Wars and the Structure of Multi-Plant Firms

Simon Lapointe and Pierre-Henri Morand ()

No 115, Working Papers from VATT Institute for Economic Research

Abstract: Governments spend large amounts of money to attract firms to their territory, often resulting from bidding wars against other regions. Previous papers show that such bidding wars can improve social welfare by allocating the investment to the regions that value it the most. In this paper, we depart from the usual assumption of exogenous, single-plant investment. We show that in this context, bidding wars incite the firm to allocate its investment strategically, by investing more and differentiating the plants. In turn, the firm receives larger subsidies. Despite these distortions, bidding wars may remain socially optimal, as in simpler models.

Keywords: subsidies; regional governments; bidding wars; multi-establishment firms; auctions; Local public finance and provision of public services; Business regulation and international economics; D44; H71; H25; D21; L23; Elinkeinopolitiikka (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ind and nep-reg
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https://www.doria.fi/handle/10024/166937

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Working Paper: Subsidy Bidding Wars and the Structure of Multi-Plant Firms (2019)
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