Seat competitiveness and redistricting: Evidence from voting on municipal mergers

Janne Tukiainen, Tuukka Saarimaa and Ari Hyytinen

No 38, Working Papers from VATT Institute for Economic Research

Abstract: We analyze how (anticipated) changes in the competitiveness of the seats of municipal councilors affect their voting behavior over municipal mergers. The competitiveness of the seats changes because the merger changes the composition of political competitors and the number of available seats in the next election. We use this variation for identification and find that the smaller the increase in the competitiveness of a councilor's seat, the more likely he is to vote for the merger. These effects are not related to the behavioral responses of the voters, but arise from the councilors' desire to avoid electoral competition.

Keywords: Seat competitiveness, local politics, municipal mergers, Public services, Julkiset palvelut, Effectiveness of public services, Julkisten palvelujen vaikuttavuus, C340 - Econometric Methods: Multiple/Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables: Truncated and Censored Models, C350 - Econometric Methods: Multiple/Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables: Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models, D720 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior, H110 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government, H770 - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism, C360 - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables: Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimation, (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cse, nep-pol and nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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