Primary Effect in Open-List Elections

Jaakko Meriläinen and Janne Tukiainen

No 79, Working Papers from VATT Institute for Economic Research

Abstract: We study how political parties select political leaders. Using regression discontinuity design and data from Finnish local elections, we find that parties use vote ranks to decide upon promotions. Moreover, we show that this primary effect is higher when competition either between or within parties is lower. We document differences in promotion patterns between parties, the primary effect being stronger in right-wing parties. This result is in line with previous research arguing that right-wing parties prefer more inclusive nomination procedures. Finally, our descriptive analysis suggests that parties weight previous political experience and candidates' policy positions in their promotion decisions more than voters value these characteristics.

Keywords: Political promotions, Preference votes, Primary effect, Regression discontinuity design, Local public economics, Kunnallistalous, Effectiveness of public services, Julkisten palvelujen vaikuttavuus, C210 - Econometric Methods: Single Equation Models; Single Variables: Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models, D720 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior, (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.doria.fi/handle/10024/148735

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fer:wpaper:79

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from VATT Institute for Economic Research Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Anita Niskanen ().