Mechanism design and the collective approach to household behavior

Carlos Eugênio da Costa () and Lucas Alves Estevam de Lima

No 808, FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) from EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil)

Abstract: Do the Revelation and Taxation Principles hold for multi-person householDo the Revelation and Taxation Principles hold for multi-person households? We provide a positive answer to the former and a negative to the latter if the household decision process is such that no mechanism can lead to inefficient choices. This unconditional version of Chiappori’s (1988) collective approach, offers a household model which can be used in a standard mechanism design approach.ds? We provide a positive answer to the former and a negative to the latter if the household decision process is such that no mechanism can lead to inefficient choices. This unconditional version of Chiappori’s (1988) collective approach, offers a household model which can be used in a standard mechanism design approach.

Date: 2019-08-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fgv:epgewp:808

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