On policy interactions among nations: when do cooperation and commitment matter?

Hubert Kempf () and Leopold von Thadden

No 2008-05, FRB Atlanta Working Paper from Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta

Abstract: This paper offers a framework to study commitment and cooperation issues in games with multiple policymakers. To reconcile some puzzles in the recent literature on the nature of policy interactions among nations, we prove that games characterized by different commitment and cooperation schemes can admit the same equilibrium outcome if certain spillover effects vanish at the common solution of these games. We provide a detailed discussion of these spillovers, showing that, in general, commitment and cooperation are nontrivial issues. Yet in linear-quadratic models with multiple policymakers, commitment and cooperation schemes are shown to become irrelevant under certain assumptions. The framework is sufficiently general to cover a broad range of results from the recent literature on policy interactions as special cases, both within monetary unions and among fully sovereign nations.

Keywords: International economic relations; Game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.atlantafed.org/-/media/documents/resea ... s/wp/2008/wp0805.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: On policy interactions among nations: when do cooperation and commitment matter ? (2008)
Working Paper: On policy interactions among nations: when do cooperation and commitment matter? (2008)
Working Paper: On Policy Interactions Among Nations: When Do Cooperation and Commitment Matter? (2008)
Working Paper: On policy interactions among nations: when do cooperation and commitment matter ? (2008)
Working Paper: On policy interactions among nations: when do cooperation and commitment matter ? (2008)
Working Paper: On policy interactions among nations: when do cooperation and commitment matter? (2008)
Working Paper: On policy interactions among nations: when do cooperation and commitment matter ? (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedawp:2008-05

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in FRB Atlanta Working Paper from Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Rob Sarwark ().