Job search with bidder memories

Carlos Carrillo-Tudela, Guido Menzio and Eric Smith

No 2009-28, FRB Atlanta Working Paper from Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta

Abstract: This paper revisits the no-recall assumption in job search models with take-it-or-leave-it offers. Workers who can recall previously encountered potential employers in order to engage them in Bertrand bidding have a distinct advantage over workers without such attachments. Firms account for this difference when hiring a worker. When a worker first meets a firm, the firm offers the worker a sufficient share of the match rents to avoid a bidding war in the future. The pair share the gains to trade. In this case, the Diamond paradox no longer holds.

Date: 2009
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.frbatlanta.org/-/media/documents/resea ... s/wp/2009/wp0928.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: JOB SEARCH WITH BIDDER MEMORIES (2011)
Working Paper: Job Search with Bidder Memories (2009)
Working Paper: Job Search with Bidder Memories (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedawp:2009-28

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in FRB Atlanta Working Paper from Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Rob Sarwark ().