EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Managing Risk in Cards Portfolios: Risk Appetite and Limits

Tiffany Eder, Claire Labonne, Caitlin O'Loughlin and Krish Sharma

No 24-01, Supervisory Research and Analysis Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of Boston

Abstract: We describe an important risk management tool at financial institutions, risk appetite frameworks. We observe those frameworks for credit cards portfolios at four large banks and analyze when and why banks adjust them. The risk appetite frameworks for these banks monitor 40 to 150 metrics. We focus on metrics related to outstanding balances of which we identified 79. Overall, we find that these frameworks are sticky. Most adjustments occur during scheduled annual reviews and are relatively limited. Limit breaches are rare. Thresholds are often changed the month after a breach or after the utilization rate crossed 90 percent, but most breaches imply risk mitigating measures such as tightening credit standards. Notably, managers’ reactions were even stickier in the pandemic period.

Keywords: banking supervision; risk management; risk limits; risk appetite framework; credit cards (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G32 G38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35
Date: 2024-02-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-pay and nep-rmg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.bostonfed.org/publications/risk-and-po ... -appetite-and-limits Summary (text/html)
https://www.bostonfed.org/-/media/Documents/Workingpapers/PDF/2024/sra2401.pdf Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedbqu:97930

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Supervisory Research and Analysis Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Spozio ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-30
Handle: RePEc:fip:fedbqu:97930