Branching of banks and union decline

Alexey Levkov

No QAU10-7, Supervisory Research and Analysis Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of Boston

Abstract: This paper proposes a novel explanation for the decline in unions in the United States since the late 1970s: state-by-state removal of geographical restrictions on branching of banks. Bank branch deregulation reduces union membership in the non-banking sectors by intensifying entry of new firms, especially in sectors with high dependence on external finance. New firm entry, in turn, is associated with a reduction in union wage premium, and subsequently leads to adverse union voting. I provide empirical evidence for these channels using repeated cross-sectional and panel data of U.S. workers and union representation election outcomes.

Keywords: Branch banks; Labor unions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.bostonfed.org/bankinfo/qau/wp/2010/qau1007.htm (text/html)
http://www.bostonfed.org/bankinfo/qau/wp/2010/qau1007.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedbqu:qau10-7

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Supervisory Research and Analysis Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Spozio ().