Compensation and risk incentives in banking and finance

Jian Cai, Kent Cherny and Todd T. Milbourn

Economic Commentary, 2010, issue Sep

Abstract: We review why executive compensation contracts are often structured the way they are, analyze risk incentives stemming from various pay schemes, and examine the tendency of the banking and finance industry toward excessive risk-taking. Studying the typical executive pay structures in banking and finance before the financial crisis reveals some potentially problematic practices. These practices may have encouraged ?short-termism? and excessive risk-taking, which are two behaviors bank regulators aim to prevent with their recently issued guidance on incentive compensation.

Keywords: Executives - Salaries; Financial risk management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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