Private takings

Ed Nosal

No 713, Working Papers (Old Series) from Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

Abstract: This paper considers the implications associated with a recent Supreme Court ruling that can be interpreted as supporting the use of eminent domain in transferring the property rights of one private agent?a landowner?to another private agent?a developer. Compared to voluntary exchange, when property rights are transferred via eminent domain, landowners? investments in their properties become more inefficient and, as a result, any benefit associated with mitigating the holdout problem between landowners and the developer is reduced. Social welfare can only increase if the holdout problem is significant; otherwise, social welfare will fall when property rights are transferred via eminent domain.

Keywords: Eminent; domain (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe and nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Private takings (2017)
Working Paper: Private Takings (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedcwp:0713

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DOI: 10.26509/frbc-wp-200713

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