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Bank and sovereign risk feedback loops

Aitor Erce

No 227, Globalization Institute Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas

Abstract: Measures of Sovereign and Bank Risk show occasional bouts of increased correlation, setting the stage for vicious and virtuous feedback loops. This paper models the macroeconomic phenomena underlying such bouts using CDS data for 10 euro-area countries. The results show that Sovereign Risk feeds back into Bank Risk more strongly than vice versa. Countries with sovereigns that are more indebted or where banks have a larger exposure to their own sovereign, suffer larger feedback loop effects from Sovereign Risk into Bank Risk. In the opposite direction, in countries where banks fund their activities with more foreign credit and support larger levels of non-performing loans, the feedback from Bank Risk into Sovereign Risk is stronger. According to model estimates, financial rescue operations can increase feedback effects from bank risk into sovereign risk. These results can be useful for the official sector when deciding on the form of financial rescues.

JEL-codes: E58 G21 G28 H63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2015-02-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn, nep-eec and nep-mac
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:feddgw:227

DOI: 10.24149/gwp227

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