A computationally efficient characterization of pure strategy Nash equilibria in large entry games

Andrew M. Cohen
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Andrew M. Cohen: https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/andrew-m-cohen.htm

No 2005-37, Finance and Economics Discussion Series from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.)

Abstract: This note presents a simple algorithm for characterizing the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria in a broad class of entry games. The algorithm alleviates much of the computational burden associated with recently developed econometric techniques for estimating payoff functions inferred from entry games with multiple equilibria.

Keywords: Game theory; Econometric models; Equilibrium (Economics) (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp and nep-gth
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