How do joint supervisors examine financial institutions? the case of state banks

Marcelo Rezende
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Marcelo Rezende: https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/marcelo-rezende.htm

No 2011-43, Finance and Economics Discussion Series from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.)

Abstract: This paper studies what determines whether federal and state supervisors examine state banks independently or together. The results suggest that supervisors coordinate examinations in order to support states with lower budgets and capabilities and more banks to supervise. I find that states with larger budgets examine more banks independently, that they accommodate changes in the number of banks mostly through the number of examinations with a federal supervisor and that, when examining banks together, state banking departments that have earned quality accreditation are more likely to write conclusion reports separately from federal supervisors. The results also indicate that regulation impacts supervision by changing the characteristics of banks. Independent examinations decrease with branch deregulation, which is consistent with the facts that this reform consolidated banks within fewer independent firms and that state and federal supervisors are more likely to examine large and complex institutions together.

Keywords: Bank examination - United States; Bank supervision - United States (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban and nep-cba
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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