The Effects of Bank Charter Switching on Supervisory Ratings

Marcelo Rezende
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Marcelo Rezende: https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/marcelo-rezende.htm

No 2014-20, Finance and Economics Discussion Series from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.)

Abstract: I study whether commercial banks can improve their supervisory ratings by switching charters. I use the fees charged by chartering authorities to establish a causal effect from switching on ratings. Banks receive more favorable ratings after they change charters, an effect that is large for both national and state charters. In addition, controlling for bank ratings, banks that switch charters fail more often than others. These results suggest that banks can arbitrage ratings by switching charters and are consistent with regulators competing for banks by rating incoming banks better than similar banks that they already supervise.

Keywords: bank charters; bank regulators; banking supervision; ratings (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 64 pages
Date: 2014-03-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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