Reputation and Liquidity Traps

Taisuke Nakata

No 2014-50, Finance and Economics Discussion Series from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.)

Abstract: Can the central bank credibly commit to keeping the nominal interest rate low for an extended period of time in the aftermath of a deep recession? By analyzing credible plans in a sticky-price economy with occasionally binding zero lower bound constraints, I find that the answer is yes if contractionary shocks hit the economy with sufficient frequency. In the best credible plan, if the central bank reneges on the promise of low policy rates, it will lose reputation and the private sector will not believe such promises in future recessions. When the shock hits the economy sufficiently frequently, the incentive to maintain reputation outweighs the short-run incentive to close consumption and inflation gaps, keeping the central bank on the originally announced path of low nominal interest rates.

Keywords: Credible policy; forward guidance; reputation; sustainable plan; time consistency; trigger strategy; zero lower bound (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E32 E52 E61 E62 E63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 63 pages
Date: 2014-06-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac and nep-mon
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Reputation and Liquidity Traps (2018)
Working Paper: Reputation and Liquidity Traps (2014)
Working Paper: Reputation and Liquidity Traps (2014)
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