The Effects of Institutional Investor Objectives on Firm Valuation and Governance

Paul Borochin and Jie Yang
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Jie Yang: https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/jie-yang.htm

No 2016-088, Finance and Economics Discussion Series from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.)

Abstract: We find that ownership by different types of institutional investor has different implications for future firm misvaluation and governance characteristics. Dedicated institutional investors decrease future firm misvaluation relative to fundamentals, as well as the magnitude of this misvaluation. In contrast, transient institutional investors have the opposite effect. Using SEC Regulation FD as an exogenous shock to information dissemination, we find evidence consistent with dedicated institutions having an information advantage. The valuation effects are primarily driven by institutional portfolio concentration while the governance effects are driven by portfolio turnover. These results imply a more nuanced relationship between institutional ownership and firm value and corporate governance.

Keywords: Institutional investors; Investor type; Dedicated; Transient; Misvaluation; Corporate governance; Blockholding; Portfolio turnover; Information dissemination; SEC Regulation FD (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G14 G30 G32 G38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 69 pages
Date: 2016-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2016-88

DOI: 10.17016/FEDS.2016.088

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