Quantitative Easing and Bank Risk Taking: Evidence from Lending

John Kandrac and Bernd Schlusche
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John Kandrac: https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/john-kandrac.htm
Bernd Schlusche: https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/bernd-schlusche.htm

No 2017-125, Finance and Economics Discussion Series from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.)

Abstract: We empirically assess the effect of reserve accumulation as a result of quantitative easing (QE) on bank-level lending and risk taking activity. To overcome the endogeneity of bank-level reserve holdings to banks' other portfolio decisions, we employ instruments made available by a regulatory change that strongly influenced the distribution of reserves in the banking system. Consistent with theories of the portfolio substitution channel in which the transmission of QE depends in part on reserve creation itself, we document that reserves created in two distinct QE programs led to higher total loan growth and an increase in the share of riskier loans, such as commercial real estate, construction, C&I, and consumer loans, within banks' loan portfolios.

Keywords: Monetary policy; QE; bank lending; reserve balances (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 E58 G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 55 pages
Date: 2017-10-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cba, nep-mac and nep-mon
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2017-125

DOI: 10.17016/FEDS.2017.125

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