Efficient Public Good Provision in Networks: Revisiting the Lindahl Solution

Anil K. Jain
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Anil K. Jain: https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/anil-k-jain.htm

No 1210, International Finance Discussion Papers from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.)

Abstract: The provision of public goods in developing countries is a central challenge. This paper studies a model where each agent?s effort provides heterogeneous benefits to the others, inducing a network of opportunities for favor-trading. We focus on a classical efficient benchmark ? the Lindahl solution ? that can be derived from a bargaining game. Does the optimistic assumption that agents use an efficient mechanism (rather than succumbing to the tragedy of the commons) imply incentives for efficient investment in the technology that is used to produce the public goods? To show that the answer is no in general, we give comparative statics of the Lindahl solution which have natural network interpretations. We then suggest some welfare-improving interventions.

Keywords: Networks; Public goods; β-core; Repeated games; Coalitional deviations; Institutions; Centrality; Lindahl equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D60 H41 O43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2017-07-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic, nep-ppm and nep-pub
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedgif:1210

DOI: 10.17016/IFDP.2017.1210

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