The Elusive Gains from Nationally-Oriented Monetary Policy

Martin Bodenstein, Giancarlo Corsetti and Luca Guerrieri

No 1271, International Finance Discussion Papers from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.)

Abstract: The consensus in the recent literature is that the gains from international monetary cooperation are negligible, and so are the costs of a breakdown in cooperation. However, when assessed conditionally on empirically-relevant dynamic developments of the economy, the welfare cost of moving away from regimes of explicit or implicit cooperation may rise to multiple times the cost of economic fluctuations. In economies with incomplete markets, the incentives to act non-cooperatively are driven by the emergence of global imbalances, i.e., large net-foreign-asset positions; and, in economies with complete markets, by divergent real wages.

Keywords: Monetary policy cooperation; Global imbalances; Open-loop Nash games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E44 E61 F42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 61
Date: 2020-02-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mac, nep-mon and nep-opm
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/ifdp/files/ifdp1271.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The Elusive Gains from Nationally Oriented Monetary Policy (2025)
Working Paper: The Elusive Gains from Nationally-Oriented Monetary Policy (2020)
Working Paper: The Elusive Gains from Nationally-Oriented Monetary Policy (2020)
Working Paper: The Elusive Gains from Nationally-Oriented Monetary Policy (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedgif:1271

DOI: 10.17016/IFDP.2020.1271

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in International Finance Discussion Papers from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ryan Wolfslayer ; Keisha Fournillier ().